nature of many of these investors --a significant component of the problems associated with them can be attributed to domestic weaknesses present in even the most advanced economies of the region. It is these weaknesses that I attempt to identify here, as they most likely represent the primary Latin American challenge in the near future. With this objective, the bulk of the evidence presented here corresponds to the recent experiences of Argentina, Chile, and Mexico, three of the most advanced economies in the region.
Rather than attempting to characterize every possible shock and amplification mechanism, this paper offers a parsimonious account of volatility in countries that have already tamed most of the traditional sources of macroeconomic instability in Latin America. It builds on two widely observed weaknesses: (i) weak links with international financial markets, and (ii) underdeveloped domestic financial markets. Once interacting, these two ingredients not only explain the observed volatility but they also generate clear externalities that require policy intervention. This framework thus provides a clear foundation for policy analysis. Most other shocks and deficiencies are leveraged -even made possible -by these two factors. Moreover, to the frustration of highly competent policymakers, the environment becomes intolerant of policy mistakes.
II. Diagnostic and Analysis
In this section I provide a conceptual framework, hopefully flexible enough to be adapted to a broad set of circumstances, albeit precise enough to speculate on policy issues. The first and main part of this section presents the essence of the framework, while the second part discusses a few canonical shocks and their impact within the outlined environment. 4 I refer to these parts as "the core" (of the analysis) and "the periphery," respectively.
II.1 The Core

The Ingredients
Emerging economies are distinctly characterized by two fundamental weaknesses: (i) a weak link to international financial markets, and (ii) underdeveloped domestic financial markets. One can think of these two ingredients as the core, in the sense that even after addressing the traditional imbalances they remain present and ready to cause and leverage crises. I provide some evidence for each of these key ingredients below.
A. Weak international financial links. These are simply financial constraints, possibly time-varying, that limit the public and private international borrowing (broadly understood) of emerging countries. Weak links to international financial markets limit the smoothing of shocks over time and are themselves a source of shocks, creating excessive volatility in the real economy.
The evidence for this is substantial. Just to highlight a few dimensions of this problem, consider:
i)
Quantities. An immediate piece of evidence is that Latin American economies, unlike OECDs, typically exhibit pro-cyclical fiscal deficits. 5 As standard macroeconomic stabilization arguments indicate that these deficits ought to be counter-cyclical, this pattern has been interpreted as a seriously sub-optimal policy, and most likely the result of the financial constraints faced by the governments themselves. Additional evidence is present in the very low levels of current account deficits when compared to a neoclassical benchmark, or the large swings in capital flows that bear little relation -at least in terms of magnitude -to changes in fundamentals.
ii)
Prices. There is also evidence of financial constraints in the price data. Figure 1 illustrates the path of an index of sovereign spreads for Latin America's largest 
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Note: the time series is an average of Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela.
. iii) (Self-fulfilling?) Volatility premium. Moreover, while less than prime corporate assets in the U.S. also suffered during the Asian and Russian crises, the rise in their premia was substantially smaller. This difference can also be appreciated over longer time intervals. Table 1 , for example, compares the performance of several Argentine sovereign bonds with that of several U.S. corporate bonds of equivalent rating. The table reports the average spreads of these instruments over U.S. Treasury instruments, as well as the variance of these spreads and that of their changes. The evidence illustrates that, relative to U.S. corporate bonds, Latin
American bonds pay a higher spread and their returns are substantially more volatile. 6 Moreover, the spread-premium is probably a result of this "excess volatility" that mostly comes from episodes when financial markets tighten for emerging markets. Latin American bonds look "illiquid" from the point of view $ VLPLODU SDWWHUQ DSSHDUV LQ RWKHU /DWLQ $PHULFDQ FRXQWULHV 6HH &DEDOOHUR F IRU HYLGHQFH LQ 0H[LFR of spreads and volatility, despite the fact that their volume is often much larger that that of the specific U.S. corporate bonds described in the B. Underdeveloped domestic financial markets. Turning to the second ingredient, the development of domestic financial markets is instrumental not only in fostering investment and growth, but also in aggregating resources during distress.
Underdeveloped financial markets limit the prompt reallocation of resources, creating wasteful contractions in those markets most affected by shocks or less plugged into the financial system. On the other hand, as financial development rises so does leverage, and with it the vulnerability of the financial system to shocks also increases. Many Latin
7KH FRQFOXVLRQV PXVW EH LQWHUSUHWHG FDXWLRXVO\ VLQFH LW LV GLIILFXOW WR DVVHVV WKH UHODWLYH GLYHUVLILFDWLRQ IHDWXUHV RI WKHVH
American economies have suffered at both ends: chronic financial repression and underdevelopment and, when moving away from that, large collapse of the banking system.
Most significantly, following Krishnamurthy (1999, 2000) , I will argue below that it is this domestic underdevelopment that naturally creates externalities that justify macroeconomic policies aimed at improving the country's international liquidity management.
Later on I discuss "shocks" to the domestic financial sector, while here I simply highlight 
A Simple Model
With the help of a few diagrams, in this section I outline a structure to think through the macroeconomic consequences -and later on, the policy implications -of the two coreingredients highlighted above. 9 It is not too farfetched to think about an emerging economy's timeline in the terms described in Figure 3 . Date 0 corresponds to "normal" times, when investment, planning 2 represents the future, always brighter than the present, but a significant obstacle is that the country -both its sovereign as well as its corporations -often fails to persuade foreign financiers fully that they will share in that bright future if they help to avert the crisis (weak international financial links). Figure 4 describes the elements creating a crisis driven entirely by insufficient external resources, but with a perfectly functioning domestic financial system -that is, when only the first ingredient is present. We can think of a crisis as a time when, (a) a significant fraction of firms or economic agents are in need of financing to either repay debt or implement new investments needed to save high return projects, and (b) on net, the economy as a whole needs substantial external resources but does not have enough assets and commitment to obtain them. Loosely, I refer to these assets and commitment as "collateral," which needs not be interpreted literally as pledged assets but as the resources that are likely to be recouped by a lender. In order to make things as stark as possible, 10 Moreover, many of the business cycle recessions as opposed to deep crisis episodes occur at date 0, when Much of the policy discussion later on has to do with increasing the value of this parameter. Domestic financial markets are essentially the place where up to λ t A t date1 resources are made available to the distressed firms, who have date 2 assets A n to pledge in exchange.
External Crisis
When the economy's pledgeable resources are greater than the needs of distressed firms, arbitrage keeps the internal cost of funds L equal to the international interest rate (normalized to one here), all distressed firms are able to borrow funds, and only a fraction of domestic collateral A n needs to be pledged. This is the case in panel (a) of Figure 5 . In this simple example, where all projects have the same high return, the domestic demand for international liquidity by distressed firms is flat up to the point where all projects are fully refinanced. The supply, on the other hand, is flat at the international interest rate to hoard and supply international liquidity is weakened. Market-making is not a great business in a market with constrained demands. Imperfect domestic financial markets are captured here by the assumption that only a fraction λ n <1 of a distressed firm's value can be pledged.
Panel (a) in Figure 6 illustrates the scenario just described. Given the date 0 allocations, a decline in λ n reduces the effective demand (payment capacity) of international liquidity.
While the marginal product curve remains unchanged (dashed line), the effective demand curve (solid line) shifts down as the maximum payment per unit of investment is only
SULYDWH FRQWURO ULJKWV 7KHVH DEUXSW FKDQJHV LQ VORSHV DUH RQO\ PHDQW WR FDSWXUH DV FOHDUO\ DV SRVVLEOH WKH IDFW WKDW WKHUH DUH UHJLRQV ZKHUH PRVW ILUPV FDQ VDWLVI\ WKHLU ILQDQFLDO QHHGV DQG WKH FRVW RI FUHGLW LV GHWHUPLQHG E\ LQWHUQDWLRQDO FRQGLWLRQV DQG RWKHUV ZKHUH LW LV WKH GRPHVWLF DYDLODELOLW\ RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO DVVHWV WKDW GHWHUPLQHV VXFK FRVW
λ n A n. As long as pledgeable assets are greater than the opportunity cost of funds (the international interest rate), however, domestic providers will make these loans.
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But domestic availability of international collateral will not remain unchanged. In this environment, frictions in the market for domestic assets distort the private returns of holding domestic and international collateral. The ex-ante equilibrium response to such distortion at date 0 is captured in panel (b), with an inward shift in the ex-ante supply of international liquidity/collateral. Since domestic financial constraints limit the returns received by international liquidity providers below the full return of distressed projects, the incentive to provide such liquidity declines. In so doing, the economy experiences more frequent fire sales and more severe distress in the event of an international squeeze on the country. The economy is in the end made too vulnerable to external shocks as 13 Note that a decline in L does not necessarily imply that the domestic interest rate falls relative to the case with better developed domestic financial markets (for given international liquidity). It may imply instead that a larger share of the domestic "loan" becomes uncolletaralized.
domestic investors do not value international liquidity enough, creating less international collateral than is socially optimal.
Distorted External Maturity Structure and Currency Denomination.
A similar situation arises with respect to short versus long term debt, and with respect to the currency denomination of external debt. Long term debt is like short-term debt plus rollover insurance. When domestic financial markets are underdeveloped, there is less incentive to buy the insurance than is socially optimal since the holders of that insurance that do not experience distress and financial needs at date 1 do not receive the full social return of their guaranteed debt-rollover. Similarly, denominating external debt in domestic currency amounts to adding a hedge against depreciations. For the reasons exposed above, this hedge will be undervalued by the domestic private sector as well. I will return to these issues in the policy section.
To summarize, I have portrayed the core of an advanced emerging economy in terms of two basic features. First, it frequently finds itself near the limit of its capacity for international financing (stocks or flows). In such a position, intertemporal smoothing is limited and changes in external or domestic conditions can have potentially large effects on domestic activity. Second, domestic transfers of value are limited by underdeveloped financial markets and the institutions that support them (see policy section). As a result, the incentive to reduce the vulnerability brought about by the first feature is undervalued by the private sector. Thus, the decentralized equilibrium is excessively volatile. In the next section I discuss shocks within this framework and in section III I discuss appropriate policy responses to deal with the excess volatility problems given the structure (the λs) as well as measures to improve the structure.
II.2 Shocks and the Periphery
Continuing with a minimalist approach, I argue here that once in the environment described above, the bulk of the volatility observed in advanced Latin American economies can be described using just two canonical external shocks. Sometimes it is the direct effect of these shocks that creates volatility, while in others it is simply the fear of them that leads the authorities to create precautionary recessions, or the private sector to speculate on their potential arrival.
Canonical Shocks
External financial shocks. The most direct shock conducive to a fire sale and crisis is indeed a sudden loss in the international appeal of a country's assets. This can be due to country-specific factors as well as to changes and shocks in the segments of international financial markets relevant for the country. The turmoil after the Russian crisis in October 1998, as well as the debt crises that followed U.S. interest tightening during the early 1980s, are two prototypical examples of the latter.
A shock of this nature can be captured in the model as a deterioration in the quality of an emerging economy's international collateral, λ t , that shifts the supply curve to the left as the country's capacity to borrow abroad is reduced. As the spread between the domestic and international interest rates rises, there is a fire sale of domestic assets because the domestic opportunity cost of holding these assets is high when credit is scarce. 14 The counterpart of the fire sale is the limited reinvestment and costly termination of distressed high net present value projects. Speculative Attacks and Credibility Problems. At times, as indeed was the case of Chile in the episode described above, the private sector also anticipates the potential external bottleneck. In doing so, it typically runs against the currency and domestic assets, exacerbating their fire sale and the central bank's precautionary tightening. It is important to note, nonetheless, that absent the potential external constraint these attacks have a very diminished chance of succeeding, and that a fragile domestic financial system makes these attacks more likely and more costly (see below).
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Conversely, the much-needed adjustment of the real exchange rate during times of external crises -an adjustment that is mostly required by the limited availability of external financing− is sometimes hampered by the lack of credibility of domestic monetary policy. The case of Mexico during the Russian crisis makes the point. Table 2 compares the experience of Mexico to that of more advanced economies with flexible exchange rate systems: Australia and Canada. It is apparent from the table that while all these countries experienced large and comparable nominal depreciations during this period, Mexico had much less to show for it in terms of a real-devaluation as inflation eroded a large part of the nominal depreciation. Rather mechanically, one can interpret this in terms of a very high pass-through. My view is that the problem results from a lack of a credible monetary anchor that drives both the exchange rate and domestic inflation up at the first sight of trouble. Figure 2 hides important dynamic and cyclical aspects of financial markets, and of banks in particular. These play important roles as amplification and causes of external crises. Panel (a) of Figure 9 illustrates the severe Mexican credit crunch that followed the "tequila" crisis. Loans, and in particular new loans, imploded early on during the crisis, especially as the currency went into free fall and dragged the already weak balance sheets of Mexican banks with it. There is no doubt that the severe credit crunch significantly leveraged the 94-95 crisis and that the collapse in the banking system will impose costs on the economy and the public accounts for many years to come. 
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The basic model is easily extended to include a banking sector that replaces the domestic credit chains discussed above. For example, in order to capture a Mexican-style credit crunch, let banks make loans to firms funded at date 0 by issuing debt to foreigners. At date 1, domestic holders of international assets mortgage them and deposit the proceeds in the banking system that in turn intermediates new loans to distressed firms. Banks are subject to capital adequacy standards such that the ratio of the market value of capital to loans must be at least α. When banks are unconstrained, the economy is equivalent to that described above with perfect domestic financial markets and weak financial links.
Once adequacy standards bind, however, the supply curve for internal funds becomes backward bending as bank capital is eroded by higher interest rates that in turn lower asset prices.
Panel (a) of Figure 10 illustrates that this fire sale of assets may sharply reduce the banking sector's lending capacity, creating a credit crunch. Frictions in the banking sector are actually more serious than those described in undeveloped financial markets above.
Constrained banks become a financial bottleneck as excess domestic resources are not properly channeled to distressed firms, wasting otherwise good international collateral.
While the contraction in loan supply causes the increase in interest rates, the collapse in asset prices amplifies the impact of the crisis by deepening the credit crunch caused by distressed banks' balance sheets. Panel (b) demonstrates that the feedback between asset prices and feasible intermediation can easily bring about the possibility of multiple equilibria.
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Further Amplification Mechanisms: Crowding out and Labor Market Rigidities
Traditional sources of macroeconomic problems become more troublesome in the financially fragile environment that affects Latin American economies.
Crowding out by the government. When financing from foreigners evaporates, Latin
American governments frequently turn to domestic markets for financing, crowding out private sector investment. This is costly, since one of the main features of financial crises is that funds lose their fungibility -it is no longer irrelevant where the government gets its funding from. Moreover, it is the government that normally has the most opportunity to access international financial markets. Thus, the government should shift its financing away from domestic markets. The Argentine case during the "tequila crisis" illustrates the lack of such adjustment. Panel (a) in Figure 11 shows that during that episode there was a sharp increase in the share of loans by domestic banks going to the government. 23 The slow recovery of loans to the private sector relative to deposits described above can be partly attributed to this shift. more or less analogous to the issues behind the private sector's λ s (that in turn may be partly due to problems of the sovereign). In such a case, tightening fiscal accounts may be an unavoidable response rather than one of smoothing across domestic margins.
)LJXUH &URZGLQJ 2XW
Crowding out by large firms -the cost of sharp interest rate reductions. As external financing tightens for large firms, they too turn to domestic markets as preferred customers, facilitating the "flight-to-quality" demand by domestic financiers. The social cost of this strategy is that small firms generally do not have access to international financial markets, regardless of price. To make matters worse, this not only happens during the crisis but it may also extend to the recovery phase. Some evidence of this can be found during the recent Chilean recession. As the perception that the worst of the crisis had passed and that the contraction was more severe than expected began to emerge, interest rates were lowered sharply, so much so that large firms may have found it advantageous to turn to domestic financial markets to obtain financing which was still difficult abroad. Panel (b) in Figure 11 illustrates approximate measures of the cost of international versus domestic borrowing for a prime Chilean firm. 24 The line in between represents the cost of borrowing in dollars. It is apparent that while before the crisis borrowing abroad was probably cheaper for these firms (especially given the real appreciation of the peso), the opposite holds after the crisis.
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Labor rigidities and inflexibility. Lastly, exchange rate and real rigidities are once again a more serious source of concern in an environment of limited financial resources. Absent the latter constraint ---and aside from medium term level problems---short-term lack of adjustment in prices should have limited impact on long term investments and projects.
Present these, on the other hand, short-term problems also affect these long-term decisions.
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Argentina is the regional prototype here, with its strict convertibility law and European style labor markets. While the credit crunch experienced by the Argentine economy during 1995 could probably not have been averted by a more flexible real wage, it is probably true that in the still unraveling recession such rigidity enhanced the crisis by generating a "collateral squeeze," that is a decline in the appeal of the firm's outlook from the point of view of the banks. 26 Firms are severely squeezed from two complementary ends: financial and labor markets.
Moreover, the relative rigidity of wages in Argentina during crises underestimates the extent of the relative rigidity of the Argentine system. On one hand, countries with more flexible exchange rate systems may choose not to utilize this flexibility as much in the midst of a crisis, when controlled devaluations are risky to play with. 27 On the other hand, and more significantly, the lack of real exchange rate adjustment today comes together with a lack of adjustment in the near future as well. The perceived present value of overvaluations relative to crisis-overvaluations is likely to be higher in the Argentine system than in more flexible ones.
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III. Policy Recommendations
The goal of the organizing framework was to highlight and understand the nature of the 
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focusing on these two primitive and ingrained features offers a clear and potentially rewarding policy target.
With this target in mind, I have arranged the main policy discussion into two groups: macroeconomic and contingent (second best), on one side, and structural (first best), on the other. In principle, the former takes the core deficiencies as given and points at policies aimed at reducing volatility within that environment. The latter, on the other hand, is about changing the core environment, a more long-term goal. In practice, this distinction is less clear since volatility itself is probably an important factor behind the pervasiveness of the core ingredients.
What follows combines a list of policy suggestions aimed at ameliorating the problems discussed above, as well as a series of caveats on conventional advice raised by the perspective adopted in this paper.
Macroeconomic and Contingent Policies
Taking the structure as given, there are essentially two policy problems: prevention and crisis management. As discussed above, underdeveloped domestic financial markets typically lead to a situation where, ex-ante, international liquidity provision is undervalued. Thus, the goal of macroeconomic policy is to reallocate international liquidity use and availability from booms to crises. During the latter, the goal is to reallocate it to those economic agents that need it the most, but this must be done with care not to affect significantly and perversely ex-ante incentives to hoard and create international liquidity. Ideally, these policies should be made contingent in order to reduce speculative behavior due to policy uncertainty. Moreover, to the extent that it is feasible, a significant component of the aggregate risk associated with external shocks should be insured away (see below).
Macroeconomic Policy
Monetary Policy. The quintessential monetary policy to deal with this international liquidity management problem, is a sterilized intervention -essentially, the central bank sells public bonds for international reserves -during the capital flows boom. The counterpart ought to be the selling back of these reserves during external crises.
Experience and theory suggest that the first half of this policy, the sterilized intervention, is hard and expensive to implement for prolonged periods, and it may even backfire as the private sector reacts perversely to the quasi-fiscal deficit, appreciation, and reserves accumulation at the central bank. 29 Thus, this is probably not an instrument that can be used for medium term prevention.
Banks in Monetary Policy.
A closely related measure that works mostly through controlling international liquidity aggregation within the country is active management of bank reserves and capital adequacy ratios, and possibly international liquidity ratios. The model sketched above hints that the level of these ratios should be increasing with respect to the degree of underdevelopment of financial markets. In principle, these requirements also need to be made procyclical. There are however two practical problems with such a recommendation. First, for those countries where the health of the banking system is suspect, weakening standards may make a run more likely -this was a concern in Argentina during the recent crisis. Second, in other cases, especially when the participation of foreign banks is large, the policy may be ineffective during crises since the constraint may not be binding. Figure 12 shows the capital adequacy ratios for different segments of the Chilean banking sector; it is apparent that foreign banks voluntarily withdrew. While there is no doubt that fostering the arrival of solid international banks is a must, it is also important to understand the implications they may have for aggregate liquidity management. F o r e ig n B a n k s D o m e s tic P r iv a te B a n k s B a n c o d e l E s ta d o F in a n c ia l S o c .
Capital controls can supplement sterilization or, in principle, slow down capital inflows (perhaps of a targeted maturity) by themselves. But there are four caveats to them.
i)
At the very least they should be made contingent on the availability of external flows, lowering them during external crises.
ii) Since an important part of the volatility in capital flows seems to be caused by suppliers' problems (e.g. hedge funds), it may be worth considering requiring liquidity-ratios from them as well.
iii) Also, the domestic "under-insurance" externality is likely to be more pronounced at the short end of the spectrum. Thus, controls should be biased toward reducing short-term capital flows. 30 Having said this, I must admit concern with the emerging "consensus" that developing economies have excessive short-term borrowing relative to their international reserves. At some level the claim is trivially right -it is impossible to have a liquidity crisis if the country holds more reserves than short-term debt and renewals. At another, figure 13 shows that emerging economies are much more prudent than developed ones along this margin. 31 Running an economy with all the precautions that "well-behaved" emerging economies do is extremely expensive. Borrowing only long-term
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(expensive) and holding large amount of reserves would most likely be considered very poor management of an average U.S. corporation. What is important here is to determine how large this ratio is relative to what the country's institutions and financial markets can support. Putting all emerging markets, regardless of financial development, in the same bag is likely to be unnecessarily burdensome for the most developed of these economies iv)
Most importantly, while the controls described above may be justifiable in terms of static second-best arguments, they are likely to hurt in the medium-run once the endogenous arrival of international market makers and corporate governance improvements are considered (see the discussion on integration for further discussion of this issue).
)LJXUH 3UHFDXWLRQDU\ 5HVHUYHV Caveats on the Exchange Rate System. Aside from the standard considerations, and the contingent aspect of it that I discuss in the next subsection, the perspective highlighted in this paper points at three additional ones in relation to sterilization: i) Since the optimal policy is one of reallocation of international reserves from high to low capital flow states, it clearly has an element of real exchange rate stabilization. Reserve management must be active and transparent. Fiscal Policy. Grounded on Keynesian mechanisms, optimal fiscal policy over the business cycle is traditionally thought of as being counter-cyclical. Latin American economies, unlike OECDs, typically exhibit the opposite pattern; fiscal deficits are procyclical rather than counter-cyclical. This pattern has been interpreted as a seriously suboptimal policy, and most likely the result of the financial constraints faced by the governments themselves. This assessment may be true but it misses an important point: if external financial shocks are an important source of fluctuations, the economy should distribute the scarce available international resources across domestic economic agents so as to smooth their differences in financial distress. It is highly unlikely that government expenditure, unless used very selectively to solve financial distress in the private sector, is the right place to allocate the marginal dollar. 34 Fiscal policy may need to be procyclical after all.
Notes: Data for 1997, except Norway data in panel (b) (1993). External debt for developed countries: BPS(IMF
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Public Debt Management. Since the government itself may trigger a crisis in the face of large debt renewal or payment, it has become a common practice to advocate a debt management strategy that avoids lumps. This is sound advice, but it is important to understand that it may lose some of its effectiveness absent other measures to reduce the externality highlighted in these notes. The reason is that while the government may reduce its own bottleneck, which is unambiguously good, the private sector will probably undo part of the smoothing. This is simply to note that it is not only the government's debt schedule that matters, but also that of the country as a whole, and the private sector may undervalue the advantages of a smooth aggregate debt repayment schedule.
Contingent Policies
As much of the modern Latin America's volatility problems can be ultimately linked to external financial factors and terms of trade shocks (themselves important only due to weak international financial links), the basis to design a solid contingent policy are clearly outlined.
Contingent Rules. While most macroeconomists would agree in principle on the cyclical features of the policies described above, much more disagreement would arise in practice.
Opposition often comes from those that put credibility issues ahead of the rest. Most prominent is the example of the exchange rate system, where the main argument in favor of dollarization and other strong-fixed systems, is their credibility. To me, however, the most credible policy is that which is most suited to the scenario faced by the country. Insurance and Hedging. Yet another manifestation of the underprovision of international liquidity that justified the policy interventions discussed above, is that international insurance is undervalued by the private sector (see Caballero and Krishnamurthy 2000) .
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If, for example, one thinks about long-term external debt as short-term debt plus a rollover insurance clause, the private sector will on average borrow at maturities that are shorter than socially optimal. Similarly, from the point of view of the economy as a whole, the private sector will underinsure with respect to terms of trade and external financial shocks.
Aside from controversial taxation of short-term capital inflows, governments often resort to stabilization funds and other self-insurance mechanisms. Industrial policy aimed at export diversification is another. 37 These are expensive and inefficient insurance methods, but unfortunately the incomplete nature of the corresponding insurance and hedging markets makes them the main available option.
Why are these markets so incomplete is a key research question, that should probably be linked to the emerging literature on underdeveloped "catastrophe risk" markets in more developed economies. Aside from incentive problems affecting countries, it is probably the case that the high correlation of commodity prices with global activity makes the capital required to insure that risk naturally very expensive and too large for insurance companies to immobilize. It is here where a market-making role by the IFIs may represent a significant aid.
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Structural Policy
But what to do with the structure, in order to improve links with international financial markets and the development of domestic financial markets?
Institutions. By now, there is widespread consensus on a series of general recommendations to improve external financial links, which can be found in most "international financial architecture" pamphlets. These recommendations include norms Fostering Integration Synergies. But it takes more than change in regulation and supervision to achieve the desired goal. A good example of this observation is the case of Chile. While Chile has and continues to make substantial progress in ensuring an appropriate legal environment as it relates to businesses, its limited size and very unequal wealth distribution makes progress on the corporate governance front difficult especially when considering its natural or "structural" ownership concentration. This hints at an important synergy in fostering a much deeper integration with international financial markets: not only is good corporate governance needed to succeed on integration, but also integration may be an essential ingredient to achieve good corporate governance as well. It is for this reason that I find capital flows taxation, while justifiable on static second best ground, potentially very harmful. A more reasonable recipe, I believe, is as follows: if the country's institutions are so far off the ideal ones that the decentralized equilibrium is very unstable, taxing capital inflows contingently may be justified. But if that is not the case, it may well pay off to bear the additional risk in exchange for a faster development of financial links and markets. Macroeconomic Collateral Requirements. Many of the structural reforms discussed above are also the key to improving the development of domestic financial markets, as indeed the latter is a pre-requisite to developing solid international financial links. There is, however, an aspect of domestic banking regulation that is worth highlighting. By observing the stock market patterns of financial and non-financial sectors, and the relation between the allocation of credit by banks and the valuation of the receiving firms, I concluded that unlike the conventional wisdom has it, there is a good case for arguing that it was not misbehavior and corruption alone that may have caused the banking sector debacle in Mexico 1994-95 (see Caballero 1999c) . A distinct possibility is that bankers substituted for their lack of knowledge -the result of many years of financial repression -by requiring collateral, mostly in the form of real estate. This practice is a great idea in the case of idiosyncratic shocks but not when these are aggregate. 41 The banks also made an error of judgement on the permanence of the fixed exchange rate system. The collapse of the system helped to destroy their balance sheets as they were very real estate intensive in loans and collateral and had apparently gambled on the off-balance sheet side (certainly a form of misbehavior). In sum, it appears that the deficiencies were not only on the banks handling of the microeconomic aspects of credit, as is often emphasized, but also, and perhaps primarily, on their handling of macroeconomic risk. Most importantly, domestic collateral -e.g. real estate -is often inadequate for crises, particularly those triggered by the sudden scarcity of capital inflows. The same holds true of loans to some non-tradeable sectors. This suggests imposing additional capital-adequacy requirements with respect to assets exposed to systemic risk, and to foster the usage of collateral that is more adequate to foreign 
